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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
"".111 ,( IT OF UTAH 
I "lain!iff Appellee, 
vs. 
PATRICK L. STANLEY, 
II i Il, iidant/Appellant. 
Case Nn '. KOPft C \ 
Prior ity No 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
' I Ihi is Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
I Jtah Code .Annotated Section 78 2a 3(2)(e) 
Il,1" iSUES PRESENTED AN D STANDARDS Oi: ixi. \ it ** 
Whether the trial c ourt' s instn ictions to the ji lrj ,r relatinp 
defense were legally sufficient? A "trial court's statutory const and its application 
of the entrapment statute presents this Court with questions of law that are reviewed for 
"coi i ectness' ""' State v , Richards, 
j ^ s | s s u e w a s r a | s e ( j ^ a .. ,.. instruction and in oral 
trial (R. 246; R. 212 at 176-90). 
° Whether the ti ial court committed plain error, or caused Stanley to suffer a 
iiiNiKiiiiilit'SJii iiiiustiu1, III mil1. liistniicliniiiL1, il 1114 I mi mi 11, i cgarding C-
substantive element of the charge 'that Stanley had a prior conviction1' 11 i ihLiin 
1 
appellate relief, Stanley must show: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is harmful. . . . " State v. Dunn. 850 P. 2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah App. 1996). 
3. Whether Stanley was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel? "Where 
the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this court can only 
determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as 
a matter of law.. .If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, but prejudice cannot be 
determined on the record before us, remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 
351, 354 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993). 
To establish ineffective counsel Stanley must show: "(1) that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the 
trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt. 
781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 
App. 1989); State v. Gearv. 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
4. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict and finding that these 
violations occurred in a "drug-free zone"? A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Goddard. 871 
2 
P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). However, this penalty enhancement adds 
an extra element to the drug offense that "must be proved beyond a reasc i^bic dmii-
State \ J uwasn^ 
i ma issue was preserved in an oral motion to dismiss die enhancement made by 
appellant at the close of the State's case (R. 212 at 54-55). 
IIII in irvanl statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A
 mature of the Case 
Honorable Lynn ^ Davis, after a jury trial at which Stanley was convicted of 
a
' i ranging to Distribute Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone, a first degree felony, 
and Possession of"I\ lethamphetamine in J I )'iii|i"" I "in, Zone with a hioi Conviction, a 
degi ee felon) 
— Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On in or about April 14 1997, Patrick I, Stanley was charged by Amended 
Informal I  11 II IIII 1 nmili I iislmul ( nun " iiillli "I 'omit I .Arranging to Distribute 
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Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv).1 Count II-Illegal Drug Tax, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 59-19-103(l)(b).2 Count Il l-
Possession or Use of Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone with a Prior Conviction, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (R. 
24). 
On June 30, 1997, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge Lynn W. 
Davis and Stanley was bound-over on all charges and "not guilty" pleas were entered 
(R. 26-27, 208). On July 9, 1997, Stanley filed a Motion to Dismiss based on 
Entrapment (R. 28-33). On July 15, 1997, an evidentiary hearing on Stanley's motion 
was conducted after which the trial court denied the motion (R. 37-38, 209). 
On September 30, 1997, Stanley filed a Motion and Limine to exclude evidence 
of prior convictions from trial under Rules 403, 404(b) and 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 101-107). 
On October 2-3, 1997, a jury trial was conducted and Stanley was convicted of 
both charges (R. 156-64, 211-213). 
On November 17, 1997, Stanley was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay fines in the amount of $1850.00 (R. 
'The criminal information and jury instruction #3 cite Count I as a violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv). However, the language set forth therein actually 
refers to Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1997). 
2This charge was subsequently dismissed by motion of the State on October 1, 1997. 
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185-86, 214). On December 17, 1997, Stanley filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Fourth District Court (R. 194). On February 19, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court 
poured-over the appeal to this Court (R. 204). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Detective J.D. Mangum 
J.D. Mangum, a detective with the Emery County Sheriffs office who is 
assigned to the Carbon-Emery, testified that in March of 1997, he was working for the 
Drug Task Force (R. 211 at 134, 135). Mangum testified that the work he did for the 
Task Force mostly consisted of undercover activities and that he would have had longer 
hair, a scruffy face, and worn street clothes in order to look like a drug dealer/buyer 
rather than a cop (R. 211 at 139). Mangum testified that the use of confidential 
informants is critical to the work of the Drug Task Force (R. 211 at 137-38). Mangum 
also testified that most informants are either current or past drug users (R. 211 at 176). 
Mangum testified that on March 27, 1997, he was contacted by a supervisor to 
meet with Edie Randall, a confidential informant, at the Emery County Jail where 
Randall was being held in-custody (R. 211 at 140). Mangum had been told that 
Randall had participated as an informant in approximately 170 controlled buys and that 
she was in custody on drug charges (R. 211 at 178, 181). 
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Mangum met with Randall early in the evening (R. 211 at 141). Randall advised 
Mangum that she wanted to get out of jail and that "she was willing to set up a drug 
deal to do that" with a Patrick Stanley (Id.). At this point, Mangum did not know 
Stanley (Id.). 
Mangum advised Randall that he would work with her and that he would arrange 
to have her released from jail on her own recognizance (R. 211 at 141-42). Mangum 
then contacted the AP&P officers who had arrested Randall and they stipulated to her 
release so Mangum contacted the Sheriff and he authorized Randall's release from 
custody (R. 211 at 142). 
Randall then paged Stanley and he returned the call (R. 211 at 142-43). 
Mangum testified that Stanley was the only individual that Randall named or called for 
a potential drug deal (R. 211 at 182). Mangum testified that Randall spoke with 
Stanley for approximately five minutes and that an agreement had been made for the 
purchase of an ounce of methamphetamine from Stanley for $1200 to be exchanged at 
the K-Mart in Spanish Fork (R. 211 at 144-45). Mangum was to act as a drug dealer 
during the exchange (R. 211 at 146, 147). Randall was to inform Stanley that she had 
been in a traffic accident and that Mangum was a friend with whom she was staying 
who wanted to purchase some methamphetamine (R. 211 at 146-47). Mangum testified 
that a recording of Randall's call with Stanley was made and that he locked it in the 
evidence locker but that the tape could not currently be found (R. 211 at 189). 
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Mangum testified that he then traveled to Springville to pick-up the $1200 while 
other officers transported Randall to Springville (R. 211 at 145). Mangum and Randall 
then proceeded to the K-Mart in Spanish Fork to meet with Stanley at approximately 9 
p.m. (R. 211 at 147-48, 149). Stanley arrived at the K-Mart after Mangum and 
Randall and he was alone (R. 211 at 149). 
Randall initially spoke with Stanley alone for a few minutes in Stanley's vehicle 
(R. 211 at 150). Randall then returned to Mangum's vehicle and informed him that 
Stanley wanted to get some dinner and that he did not have the methamphetamine (R. 
211 at 151). Stanley then went to Taco Bell (Id.). 
After Stanley returned, he, Mangum and Randall stood outside and discussed the 
deal (Id.). Randall introduced Stanley to Mangum (R. 211 at 152). Stanley then told 
Mangum that "he didn't bring the stuff with him" and that he wanted Mangum "to 
front him the whole amount of money so he could take it to Salt Lake" (R. 211 at 151-
52). According to Mangum, Stanley was told that he wanted to purchase two ounces of 
methamphetamine (R. 211 at 152). Stanley asked Mangum if he "was going to stand 
good for her debt" (R. 211 at 153). This surprised Mangum because he did not know 
"there was any debt to be had" (Id.). Mangum refused to pay the debt and testified 
that Stanley then suggested that he keep a portion of the methamphetamine in payment 
for the debt (R. 211 at 154). 
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Mangum then gave Stanley $100 and they agreed to meet later at a motel in Lehi 
after Stanley got the methamphetamine from Salt Lake City (R. 211 at 154-55). 
Mangum testified that Stanley showed no reluctance in relation to the transaction (R. 
211 at 157). 
Mangum testified that he was wearing a recording device at the K-Mart and that 
he believed that a recording was made of the meeting (R. 211 at 189). However, 
Mangum testified that he did not know where the tape currently was located and that he 
has "never had contact with that tape" (Id.). 
Mangum, Randall and the other officers who had been surveilling the meeting 
then proceeded to a motel in Lehi (R. 211 at 158-59). Mangum and Randall rented one 
room while the other officers rented an adjoining room and monitored the recording 
devices worn by Mangum and Randall and set-up in the motel room (R. 211 at 160). 
Randall then paged Stanley; and when Stanley called, he was told where to come (R. 
211 at 159-60). 
When Stanley arrived at the motel, he knocked on the door and Mangum let him 
into the room (R. 211 at 161). Stanley then spoke with Randall alone in the bathroom 
for a few minutes (R. 211 at 161-62). Stanley then informed Mangum that he only had 
one ounce of methamphetamine and that "maybe later he could get... the other half 
(R. 211 at 162). Stanley then gave Mangum the methamphetamine and Mangum gave 
him the money (R. 211 at 163). Mangum testified that Stanley then pulled some more 
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methamphetamine out and he gave some to Randall and "took a line out and snorted it" 
(Id.). 
The other officers then entered the room and Stanley and Randall were taken 
down and handcuffed (R. 211 at 165). The officers then retrieved the money from 
Stanley along with the box which contained the methamphetamine (Id.). 
Mangum testified that he was wearing a recording device in the motel room and 
that he believed a tape recording had been made of the transaction (R. 211 at 189-90). 
However, Mangum indicated that he "never had contact with that tape" (R. 211 at 
190). Mangum did testify that on one weekend, a water line broke and flooded the 
evidence room (R. 211 at 197-98). 
B. Testimony of Edee Randall 
Edee Randall testified that she met Detective Mangum at the Emery County Jail 
and that she initiated the contact (R. 212 at 22). Randall testified that she asked for 
Mangum because she had worked with him previously relating to "drugs" (R. 212 at 
22-23). Randall testified that she told Mangum that she could arrange a drug buy from 
Stanley (R. 212 at 22-23). Randall also testified that she wanted nothing from Mangum 
in return but that she "figured that he would help release me" from jail (R. 212 at 23, 
34). Randall, reluctantly, testified that she was in jail on a drug charge (R. 212 at 32). 
Randall testified that, at the time of the transaction, she had been working as a 
confidential informant for approximately six months (R. 212 at 28). Randall testified 
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that she had participated in approximately 170 controlled buys and mat she was 
compensated $75/buy (Id.). Randall testified that the only instruction she received in 
relation to her conduct as a confidential informant was to "be careful" (R. 212 at 30-
31). 
Randall then paged Stanley and he returned the call (R. 212 at 23). Randall 
testified that she asked Stanley "if he had any meth. And he said, 'Yeah,' And I asked 
him if he could meet and how much to bring" (R. 212 at 23-24). Randall also testified 
that she told Stanley that she had the money she owed him and that they could meet so 
she could give it to him (R. 212 at 35). Randall testified that she "owed him money 
from a prior drug deal" (R. 212 at 24, 35). Randall testified that Stanley that the ounce 
she wanted would cost between $800-$1200 (R. 212 at 24-25). 
Randall testified that she arranged to meet Stanley at the K-Mart in Spanish Fork 
(R. 212 at 25). Randall testified that Stanley arrived at K-Mart before she and 
Mangum did (R. 212 at 36). Randall testified that she had previously met with Stanley 
there (Id.). Randall told him that she would be with a "guy with the money" (Id.). 
Randall testified that she met wim Stanley at Spanish Fork, but mat she did not 
get inside Stanley's vehicle and that it was not outside the presence of Mangum because 
"his windows would have been down and he would have heard [her]" (R. 212 at 37). 
Randall testified that she told Stanley that Mangum was a drug dealer from Price and 
that she needed to get some methamphetamine for him to buy (R. 212 at 37-38). 
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Randall testified that she did not tell Stanley that she was afraid of Mangum or that 
Mangum had a weapon (R. 212 at 38). Randall testified that Stanley asked for the 
$350 she owed him and that she indicated that she did not have the money (R. 212 at 
39). However, Randall testified that she and Mangum gave Stanley $100 towards the 
debt and that she "would have the rest later" (R. 212 at 39). Randall testified that they 
arranged to meet later in Lehi (Id.). 
Randall testified that once Stanley arrived at the motel room in Lehi, "He 
counted out the money. He didn't have all of it. He only had, I think, half of it. He 
said he could get the other half (R. 212 at 27). Randall testified that she never told 
Stanley that she was afraid of Mangum and that Stanley showed no reluctance 
concerning the transaction (Id.). 
Randall testified that she was introduced to Stanley by Susie Webb (R. 212 at 
25). She indicated that she had known Stanley for "a month or two" and that he had 
visited her in Price "once or twice" (R. 212 at 40). Randall testified that she told 
Stanley of her husband's death in a mining accident and that she was having financial 
difficulties (Id.). 
Randall also testified that Stanley was present "several times" when she was at 
Webb's house (R. 212 at 41). However, Randall testified that she did not recall telling 
Webb that she needed money for her trailer payment; and that Stanley never loaned her 
money-he only loaned her drugs (R. 212 at 41-42). 
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Randall testified that she was relying on her friendship with Stanley in order for 
him to acquire the methamphetamine for her (R. 212 at 43). Randall testified that she 
has prior misdemeanor convictions (R. 212 at 51). Randall also testified that she was 
never given any instruction on "entrapment" or that there were certain boundaries 
relating to her conduct in getting others to purchase drugs (R. 212 at 51). 
Randall testified that her trailer was paid off in June of 1996 (R. 212 at 162). 
Randall testified that Stanley had never repaired any of her vehicles (Id.). Randall also 
testified that she had seen Stanley in the red Subaru in Lehi on some uncertain date 
prior to March 27, 1997 (R. 212 at 162-63). Randall testified that she did not speak 
with Stanley on this occasion (R. 212 at 163-64). 
C. Testimony of Patrick Stanley 
Patrick Stanley, the defendant, testified that in February-March of 1997 he lived 
in Salt Lake City (R. 212 at 69). Stanley testified that during this time he was self-
employed as a tree-trimmer (R. 212 at 69-70). Stanley testified that he was contacted 
through the use of a pager (R. 212 at 70). 
Stanley testified that he met Randall through Susie Webb (R. 212 at 71). Stanley 
testified that in March of 1997 he had known Randall for "a couple of months" (R. 212 
at 72). Stanley testified that he knew Randall's husband had died in a mining accident 
and that he had voluntarily assisted her with repairs at her home in Price on a couple of 
12 
occasions-including working on a vehicle that belonged to Randall's daughter (R. 212 
at 72-73). 
Stanley testified that the only thing he had loaned Randall was $350 to help her 
with a trailer payment (R. 212 at 73-76). Stanley testified that prior to the night of 
March 27, 1997, he never bought nor sold drugs to or from Randall (R. 212 at 76). 
Stanley testified that on approximately March 20, 1997, Randall made 
arrangements to meet Stanley at the K-Mart in Spanish Fork so that she could repay the 
$350 loan (R. 212 at 76-77). Stanley testified that Randall, however, failed to appear 
at the K-Mart at the arranged meeting time (R. 212 at 78). Stanley testified that he did 
not hear from Randall until she paged him on March 27, 1997 (R. 212 at 78-79). 
Stanley testified that he returned Randall's page (R. 212 at 79). Stanley asked 
Randall what happened the previous week and Randall told him that she had rolled her 
truck and had been in the hospital for the past week (R. 212 at 79). Randall then 
informed Stanley that she had the money she owed him and that she could meet him at 
K-Mart in Spanish Fork (R. 212 at 80). Stanley also testified that Randall told him that 
she needed him to bring her "an ounce" of methamphetamine (R. 212 at 80, 131-32). 
Stanley testified that he asked Randall if she had his money and that when she replied in 
the affirmative, an arrangement was made to meet at the Spanish Fork K-Mart at 9 
p.m. (R. 212 at 81). Randall told Stanley that she would be with a "friend" because he 
truck had been totaled (R. 212 at 83). 
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Stanley testified that he drove to Spanish Fork in a red Subaru that belonged to 
Webb's roommate, who had borrowed Stanley's truck (Id.). When Stanley arrived at 
the K-Mart, Randall was already present with Mangum, who at this time Stanley did 
not know (R. 212 at 82-83). Randall approached Stanley's vehicle and climbed into his 
passenger seat (R. 212 at 83-84). 
Stanley asked for the money she owed him and she informed him that she did not 
have it (R. 212 at 84). Stanley testified that, at this point, his "expression probably 
changed because [he] thought, 'Well, what did you call me to drive all the way out here 
for, again, telling me you had the money that you owed me, and now I get her and 
you're telling me you don't have the money you owe me?" (R. 212 at 84). Stanley 
testified that he was "very angry" (R. 212 at 85). Stanley then asked Randall why she 
arranged the meeting if she did not have the money and Randall replied that she owes 
"this guy some money and he's a drug dealer from Price" and that she needed Stanley's 
help (R. 212 at 85). 
Stanley testified that Randall then asked if he had brought her "an ounce" of 
methamphetamine; and that when Stanley said "no", Randall commented that she 
"owes this guy and I need to get him an ounce and I don't know what he'll do if I can't 
pay him" (R. 212 at 86). Stanley testified that Randall appeared nervous and scared 
(R. 212 at 86). Stanley asked Randall about her demeanor and she again indicated that 
she owed this drug dealer money (R. 212 at 87). Stanley testified that as a friend, he 
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was worried for her safety (R. 212 at 87, 136). Stanley testified that this concern was 
heightened by an experience he learned of at 15 where some drug dealers who were 
owed money cut a woman's toe off with a pair of bolt cutters (R. 212 at 88-90). 
Stanley asked Randall if Mangum had a gun and she told him that she thought he did 
(R. 212 at 90). Stanley offered to take Randall away but she told him that Mangum 
knew where she lived (R. 212 at 90-91). 
Randall then again asked Stanley for methamphetamine (R. 212 at 91). Stanley 
responded that he had none (Id.). Randall asked if to go to Salt Lake and get some. 
Stanley testified that he would think about it while getting a taco from Taco Time (R. 
212 at 91-92). Stanley testified that, at this point, Randall was almost crying (R. 212 at 
91). 
Stanley then went to Taco Time while Randall returned to Mangum's car (R. 
212 at 92). Stanley returned approximately 5-10 minutes later and met with Mangum 
and Randall in front of Stanley's car (Id.). Stanley testified that Mangum is "much 
bigger" than himself (R. 212 at 93). Stanley said that Mangum asked if Stanley was 
going to get him an ounce of methamphetamine and that he told Mangum that he did 
not have an ounce of methamphetamine and that he had come to get the money that 
Randall owed him (R. 212 at 93). Stanley then said that Mangum told Randall that she 
had not mentioned that she owed Stanley money (R. 212 at 94). Mangum then asked if 
Stanley would get him the methamphetamine if Mangum paid the debt (Id.). Stanley 
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finally agreed to try and get the methamphetamine so that Randall would not get hurt 
(R. 212 at 95-96). 
Stanley testified that arrangements were made to meet them later in Lehi and that 
he would try to get the methamphetamine while Mangum, who was tired, got some 
sleep at a motel (R. 212 at 96). Stanley testified that as he was in his car leaving 
Spanish Fork, Mangum approached the vehicle and handed Stanley $100 for Randall's 
debt and to "seal the deal" (R. 212 at 97, 136). 
Stanley then drove to Salt Lake and made calls to try and procure some 
methamphetamine (R. 212 at 98). He finally was able to procure 14 grams in a black 
box along with some baggies (R. 212 at 99). Stanley took the box and returned 
Randall's page (Id.). Stanley then drove to Lehi to meet Randall and Mangum at the 
Timpanogos Inn (Id.). 
Stanley knocked on the motel room door and Randall opened it while Mangum 
sat on the bed (R. 212 at 100). Stanley then directed Randall into the bathroom and 
handed the black box to her (R. 212 at 100-01). Randall opened the box and put some 
methamphetamine in a blue bag before putting it in the box and returning the rest to a 
separate bag (R. 212 at 102). Randall walked out of the bathroom with the bag and 
Stanley picked up the box and followed her (R. 212 at 102-03). 
Randall then handed the bag of methamphetamine to Mangum, who examined it 
before returning it to Randall (R. 212 at 103). Mangum then pulled out $600 and gave 
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it to Randall who gave it to Stanley (R. 212 at 103-04). Stanley then handed Randall 
the methamphetamine from the black box and then, before closing the box, he blew the 
remaining residue out of the box with a straw which had been inside (R. 212 at 104). 
Stanley testified that he never snorted any of the methamphetamine nor were any 
tests done to determine if he had the drug in his system (R. 212 at 104-05). 
Stanley testified that Randall and Mangum then headed for the door while 
Randall was talking with Stanley (R. 212 at 105). When Mangum turned the 
doorknob, officers entered the room and put him down on the bed and cuffed his hands 
as the box flew out of his hand (R. 212 at 105-06). 
Stanley testified that the torch and alcohol found in the back of the Subaru did 
not belong to him and that they were in a cardboard box with wood stain, steel wool 
pads and razor blades (R. 212 at 107-09). 
Stanley testified that he had never been convicted of distributing drugs but that 
he had been convicted for possession of drugs along with providing an officer with 
false information (R. 212 at 110-11). 
D. Testimony of Officer Richard Case 
Richard Case, a deputy Sheriff with the Utah County Sheriffs department, 
testified that in March of 1997 he was assigned as an undercover operative with the 
Narcotics Enforcement Team (NET) (R. 211 at 250-51, 253). Case testified that on 
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March 27, 1997, he was contacted by Mangum to provide assistance at an arranged 
drug buy (R. 211 at 253-54). 
Case testified that he monitored the Spanish Fork transaction between Mangum, 
Randall and Stanley (R. 211 at 254). Case testified that he believed that a tape 
recording was made of the transaction but that he personally did not make a tape (R. 
211 at 254-55). Case testified that if a tape was made then it was made by Sergeant 
Denton Johnston (R. 211 at 256). Case testified that sometimes there were problems 
with the recording equipment and that some tapes were inaudible (R. 211 at 256). Case 
testified that while he could not see the Spanish Fork transaction, he could hear it (R. 
2Uat257). 
Case testified that he was also present during the Lehi transaction and that he 
was stationed outside the motel watching for the arrival of Stanley's vehicle (R. 211 at 
258). After Stanley's arrest, Case assisted in the search of his vehicle (R. 211 at 259). 
Case testified that denatured alcohol, a propane torch, a razor blade, and some 
marijuana seeds were located in the vehicle (Id.). 
E. Testimony of Sergeant Denton Johnston 
Denton Johnston, a sergeant with the Orem Police Department, testified that he 
was assigned to NET in March of 1997 (R. 211 at 273). Johnston testified that he 
assisted in a drug buy on March 27, 1997 (R. 211 at 274). During the Spanish Fork 
transaction, Johnston was in a vehicle conducting surveillance (R. 211 at 274). During 
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the Lehi transaction, Johnston was part of the arrest team located in the adjoining motel 
room(R. 211 at 275). 
Johnston testified that he could hear some of the Spanish Fork transaction 
through monitoring a body wire worn by Mangum (R. 211 at 276, 278). Johnston 
testified that his vehicle is equipped with a recording device or tape recorder (Id.). 
Johnston indicated that "[he has] a habit of making a tape of everything on a wire. But 
[he has] searched for that tape and [had] not located a tape that was made that night in 
the car either at Spanish Fork or at Lehi" (Id.). Johnston testified that the only reason 
he could think of for the failure to locate a tape, was that a tape was not made (Id.). 
Johnston testified that if he had made a tape it would have been of the Spanish Fork 
transaction only because he did not have any recording equipment in the Lehi motel 
room(R. 211 at 280). 
F, Testimony of Detective Harold Terry 
Harold Terry, a detective with the Lehi City Police Department, testified that in 
March of 1997 he was assigned to NET (R. 211 at 281-82). Terry testified that he was 
monitoring the Spanish Fork transaction through Mangum's body wire and taking 
written notes of what he heard (R. 211 at 288-89). Terry testified that he heard Stanley 
and Mangum "talk about the sale of two ounces for $1200. But [Stanley] said he had 
an ounce at his house and... that he would go back to his house and get the ounce and 
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bring it to a motel in Lehi if Detective Mangum would rent the rooms (R. 211 at 290-91). 
Terry testified that he reserved motel rooms at the Timpanogos Inn in Lehi (R. 
211 at 292). Terry testified that the Timpanogos Inn is located in a drug-free zone 
because there is a playground at the McDonald's located across the street about a block 
from the Inn as well as a high school (R. 211 at 294). Terry estimated the distance to 
be approximately 630 feet (Id.). Terry said he knew the distance from a topographical 
map of the area (Id.). However, Terry did not measure the distance nor had he 
prepared a map for this case (R. 212 at 7). 
Terry testified that the red Subaru driven by Stanley was not his car (R. 212 at 
6). However, Terry testified that on March 21, 1997, he saw Stanley in the red Subaru 
in Lehi betwen 3:30-4:30 p.m. talking with Randall from her vehicle (R. 212 at 165). 
Terry testified that at the time he entered the motel room after the exchange, he 
did not believe that Mangum was standing close enough to the door to have his hand on 
the doorknob (R. 212 at 167). Terry admitted, however, that Mangum could have had 
his hand on the doorknob sometime prior to his entry into the motel room (Id.). 
G. Testimony of Suzanne Webb 
Suzanne Webb testified that she is a friend of Stanley's and that he trims trees 
for a living (R. 212 at 60). Webb testified that she is also a friend of Randall's (R. 212 
at 61). Webb testified that on February 15, 1997, she had a conversation with Randall 
(R. 212 at 62). Randall informed Webb that she was having financial difficulties and 
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that she was worried about losing her trailer (Id.). Webb offered to ask Stanley to loan 
her some money (Id.). Webb then asked Stanley to loan Randall some money so she 
would not lose her trailer (R. 212 at 62-63). Webb testified that she was present when 
Stanley loaned Randall the money (R. 212 at 63). 
Webb testified that on March 27, 1997, Stanley did not have his vehicle-a truck, 
because he had loaned it to Webb's roommate so she could move some items; and that 
Stanley was driving the roommate's red Subaru (R. 212 at 64). 
H. Stipulation relating to Testimony of Ryan Webb and Tiffany Warner 
The State stipulated that if Ryan Webb and Tiffany Warner would testify, if 
called, that Stanley loaned Randall money for a trailer payment (R. 212 at 67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One, Stanley asserts that the trial court's instruction to the jury on the issue of 
entrapment was legally insufficient because it failed to instruct the jury on the objective 
standard of entrapment and because it failed to instruct the jury on the factors they were 
to consider rendering their judgment. This inadequate instruction left the jury in a 
position that they could not fully understand the issue of entrapment which they were 
called to decide. Stanley also maintains that this deficiency was prejudicial. 
Two, Stanley asserts that under State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724 (Utah App. 
1996), the trial court committed obvious and prejudicial error by instructing the jury 
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that Stanley's prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance was a 
substantive element of Count III instead of a sentencing enhancement. Stanley asserts 
that the jury should have been given evidence of the prior conviction in a bifurcated 
manner as is required for conviction of felony DUI's and other offenses. 
Three, Stanley argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel based upon the failure of trial counsel to recognize and object to 
the plain and prejudicial error committed at trial. Stanley also bases this claim upon 
trial counsel's failure to adequately study and comprehend the language and meaning of 
the applicable statutes and case law and the corresponding language in the jury 
instructions. 
Four, Stanley asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the drug offenses actually occurred in a drug-free zone. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY RELATING TO 
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT 
Throughout the trial court proceedings, Stanley raised the defense of entrapment 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303. Stanley filed a pre-trial motion claiming 
that the case against him should be dismissed with prejudice because he was entrapped 
as a matter of law (R. 23-33). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied 
22 
Stanley's motion (R. 37-38, 209). Stanley, likewise, raised an entrapment defense at 
trial and the jury was instructed on the issue. 
Stanley asserts that the trial court's instructions to the jury as to the defense of 
entrapment were legally insufficient. This Court should review the trial court's 
statutory construction and its application of the entrapment statute as questions of law 
that are reviewed for "correctness". State v. Richardson. 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 
App. 1992). Moreover, a trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction is 
likewise a question of law which should be reviewed for "correctness". State v. 
Squire. 888 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah App. 1994). 
Prior to trial, Stanley submitted a proposed jury instruction on the issue of 
entrapment, which is included in the addenda (R. 246). Stanley's proposed instruction 
contained the language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303(1) as well as language from 
State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)--the landmark case in Utah on the issue of 
entrapment. Stanley's proposed instruction was discussed at length between Stanley, 
the State, and the trial court (R. 212 at 176-90). Over Stanley's objection, the trial 
court instructed the jury on the defense of entrapment only with the language of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-2-303(1) (R. 212 at 190). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-303(1) and Jury Instruction #11 state: 
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the 
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed 
by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense 
in order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods 
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creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. 
Stanley asserts that this instruction (Instruction #11 (R. 143)), which is included in the 
addenda, is legally insufficient: One, because it fails to instruct the jury that it should 
employ an "objective" standard of entrapment; and two, because it fails to instruct the 
jury on the factors that it shall consider in making its determination of entrapment. 
A. Jury Instruction #11 is legally insufficient because it fails to inform the jury 
of the "obejctive" standard of entrapment. 
In State v.Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
an "objective" standard or view, which focuses on the conduct of law enforcement 
personnel and not the defendant's predisposition to commit a crime, must be employed 
by fact finders under § 76-2-303 in their determination as to whether a defendant was 
entrapped. 599 P.2d at 501-03. Since Taylor. Utah courts have adhered to this 
standard or view in reviewing claims of entrapment. See, e.g., State v. Kaufman. 734 
P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1987); State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986) 
(Objective standard of entrapment focuses not on propensities of specific defendant but 
on whether police conduct "falls below standards, to which the common feelings 
respond, for the proper use of governmental power".); State v. Byrns. 911 P.2d 981, 
988 (Utah App. 1995) (Test for entrapment is objective view and focus is not on 
propensities and predisposition of specific defendant but on police conduct.); State v. 
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1995) (Utah entrapment statute requires objective 
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review of each individual situation that focuses on actions of government and not on 
defendant's predisposition.). 
Stanley asserts that the jury should have been instructed, as he requested, on the 
objective standard of entrapment and that they were to focus their deliberations on the 
conduct of the police and their agent rather than on his predisposition or propensity to 
commit the crime(R. 212 at 177-78). In addition to the statutory language set forth 
above, Stanley requested that the jury be instructed that "The entrapment defense 
requires an objective review of each situation focusing solely on the actions of the 
government and not on the defendant's predisposition" (R. 246) This language was 
utilized by this Court in State v. Beddoes. 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1995), to define 
the objective standard of entrapment. 
"The purpose of giving instructions to the jurors is to assist them in 
understanding issues which they have to decide in the case. Included in a judge's duty 
to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case is 'the right of the defendant to 
have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way.'" 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). Stanley asserts 
that without being instructed on the objective standard, the jury could not fully 
understand the defense of entrapment which was necessary to their decision in this case. 
Moreover, without instruction on the objective standard of entrapment, the jury would 
not know where to focus their deliberations as it relates to Stanley's defense of 
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entrapment. Stanley further asserts, that without such guidance to the jury, Instruction 
#11 is legally insufficient and requires reversal of his convictions. 
B. Jury Instruction #11 is legally insufficient because it failed to provide the 
jury with the factors they must consider in their determination of 
entrapment. 
Stanley asserts that Jury Instruction #11 is also legally insufficient because it 
fails to instruct the jury on the factors that it shall consider in making its determination 
of entrapment. In addition to instructing the jury on the statutory definition of 
entrapment and the objective standard, Stanley also requested that the jury instruction 
on entrapment include language from State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), which 
provides the jury with examples of possible entrapment and with factors that must be 
considered in judging the issue of entrapment under an objective standard (R. 246). 
The language that Stanley requested from Taylor reads: 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on 
sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of 
money are examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each 
case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the 
course of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the 
transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the 
defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be 
considered in judging what the effect of the governmental agent's conduct would 
be. 
(R. 246); Taylor. 599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). This language has repeatedly 
been quoted and utilized by Utah appellate courts in reviewing entrapment cases. See, 
State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989); State v. Cripps. 692 P.2d 747, 749 
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(Utah 1984); State in the Interest of J.D.W.. 910 P.2d 1242, 1243-44 (Utah App. 
1995); State v. Beddoes. 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Keitz. 856 P.2d 
685, 689 (Utah App. 1993); State v. LeVasseur. 854 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Richardson. 
843 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah App. 
1987). 
Stanley asserts that this language-this guidance-provided by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Taylor has become indispensable to any meaningful review and analysis of the 
issue of entrapment; and that the jury should have been so instructed. Furthermore, in 
Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated that "in evaluating the course of conduct 
between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions leading up to 
the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the 
inducements of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the 
governmental agent's conduct would be." 599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added). If these 
factors are "all to be considered in judging" the effect of the government's conduct, it 
is only logical that the jury should be instructed on these factors so that they know what 
to consider in their deliberations. Stanley asserts, that without such guidance, the jury 
cannot fully understand the issue of entrapment. Accordingly, he requests that this 
Court find that Jury Instruction #11 was legally insufficient and that his convictions 
must, therefore, be reversed. 
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C. The erroneous jury instruction was harmful. 
Stanley asserts that he was prejudiced by the legally insufficient instruction given 
to*the jury on the issue of entrapment. If the jury had been instructed properly on the 
issue of entrapment, as requested by Stanley, a reasonable likelihood existed of a more 
favorable result. As instructed by the trial court, the jury lacked the legal 
understanding to properly assess Stanley's entrapment defense. The jury did not know 
what test or standard to apply to their deliberations, where their focus should be, or 
what factors they must consider in judging his entrapment claim. 
For example, the jury did not know that they were to focus their attention on the 
conduct of Randall and Mangum rather than on any predisposition he might have to sell 
or use drugs. Because the jury lacked this knowledge, they could have placed undue 
influence on Stanley's prior conviction for drug possession and on Randall's testimony 
that she owed Stanley money from a prior drug deal (R. 212 at 24, 35). 
On the other hand, had the jury been instructed that their focus was to be on 
Randall and Mangum's conduct, and that they were to consider "the transactions 
leading up to the offense" and "the interaction between the agent and the defendant", 
then the jury would have considered the following: One, that Randall was a confidential 
informant who had participated in approximately 170 controlled buys and that she was 
paid $75/buy (R. 211 at 178; 212 at 28). Two, that Randall was being held in the 
Emery County Jail on drug charges (R. 211 at 140, 181; 212 at 22). Three, that 
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Randall asked to speak with Mangum (R. 212 at 22-23). Four, that Randall offered to 
arrange a drug buy with Stanley if Mangum would get her released from jail (R. 211 at 
141). Four, Mangum did not know Stanley nor that Randall owed Stanley money (R. 
211 at 141, 153). Five, that Randall-in the presence of Mangum-contacted Stanley 
and supposedly told him to bring an ounce of methamphetamine to the Spanish Fork K-
MTart (R. 211 at 144-45).3 Six, that Mangum told Randall to inform Stanley that she 
had been in a traffic accident and that Mangum was a drug-dealer friend with whom 
she was staying (R. 211 at 146-47; 212 at 37-38).4 Seven, that when Stanley met 
Mangum and Randall at the K-Mart, he asked for the money that Randall owed him and 
he had no methamphetamine with him (R. 211 at 151-52; 212 at 39, 84, 91). Eight, 
that Randall and Stanley had a conversation in his vehicle at K-Mart that could not be 
heard by Mangum or the others (although Randall denied this) (R. 211 at 150; 212 at 
83-84). Stanley testified that during this conversation, Randall appeared to be nervous 
and scared and that he was worried for her safety (R. 212 at 86, 87, 90-91). Stanley 
also testified that Randall told him that she needed his help because she owed Mangum 
3According, to Stanley's testimony, Randall informed him that she had the $350 rent 
money that she had borrowed from him and that Randall also asked him to bring an ounce 
of methamphetamine to the K-Mart (R. 212 at 76-77, 80). 
4This is consistent with Stanley's testimony that Randall had told him that she had 
been in the hospital because she had rolled her truck the previous week; and that her truck 
was totaled so that she would be with a "friend" (R. 212 at 79, 83). It is also consistent 
wkh Stanley's testimony that during his conversation with Randall in his car, Randall 
informed him that Mangum was a drug dealer from Price whom she owed money (R. 212 
at 85). 
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money and that he was a drug-dealer (R. 212 at 85). Nine, that only after this private 
conversation with Randall did Stanley agree to the drug transaction so that Randall 
would not get hurt (R. 212 at 95-96). 
Stanley asserts that had the jury been properly instructed on the objective 
standard of entrapment and the factors from Taylor that they were to consider in 
rendering their judgment, then they would have been required to consider the evidence 
set forth above, and that a reasonable likelihood existed for a more favorable result. 
Moreover, Randall clearly admitted that she relied on her friendship with Stanley in his 
acquisition of the methamphetamine (R. 212 at 43). Had the jury been properly 
instructed that "appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal 
firendship" might constitute entrapment, then Stanley, likewise, would have had a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. 
Stanley asserts that had the jury been properly instructed as to his claim of 
entrapment, a reasonable likelihood exists that he would have been given a more 
favorable result by the jury. Stanley asserts that is reasonable that a properly instructed 
jury would have found that, but for the prohibited conduct of Randall and Mangum in 
inducing him to the motel with methamphetamine, then he would not have engaged in 
the conduct for which he was convicted. Accordingly, Stanley asks that this Court 
reverse his convictions because the trial court erroneously and prejudicially instructed 
the jury as to the issue of entrapment. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT STANLEY'S PRIOR CONVICTION 
WAS A SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT OF COUNT III 
Count III of the criminal information filed against Stanley alleged that he used or 
possessed methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance. As such, Count III was charged as a first degree felony 
under Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(d) as a "second or subsequent conviction" (R. 
24). Jury Instruction #5, which sets forth the substantive elements of Count III, adds as 
a ninth element that Stanley "had previously been convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance on August 1, 1994" (R. 149). Stanley asserts that it was clear 
error for the trial court to instruct the jury that Stanley's prior conviction was a 
substantive element of Count III. Stanley asserts that the plain language of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(d) provides that prior convictions shall enhance the penalty of 
the charged crime but does not change the substantive elements of the charged crime. 
Although Stanley did not object to Jury Instruction #5, this Court may review the 
instruction under Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in order "to avoid 
a manifest injustice. See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989); and State v. 
Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court in Verde considered the 
meaning of "manifest injustice" and determined that "in most circumstances, the term 
manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard." 773 P.2d at 121-22. 
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Therefore, to obtain appellate relief for erroneous jury instructions, Stanley must show: 
"(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the 
error is harmful. . . . " State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
This Court has previously addressed this issue under Utah Code Annotated § 58-
37-8(1 )(b) and concluded that it was plain error for the trial court to include as a 
substantive element of the charged crime that defendant had a prior conviction under § 
58-37-8(l)(a). This Court held that the plain language of the statute clearly (and 
Obviously) establishes that a prior conviction does not change the nature of the charged 
crime but merely enhances the penalty. State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah 
App. 1996). As the language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(d) is substantially 
equivalent to the language of § 58-37-1(b), Stanley urges this Court to find that the trial 
court's inclusion of Stanley's prior conviction as a substantive element of Count III was 
likewise obvious error-particularly where the trial court judge in this case was the trial 
court judge in the Portillo case. 
Stanley asserts that the trial court should have bifurcated the evidence of his 
prior possession conviction from the evidence related exclusively to the commission of 
current charges. For example, in State v. Stewart. 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946), the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined a bifurcated procedure to be followed by trial courts in DUI 
cases which involve prior-DUI convictions and purport to impose a greater punishment 
for a subsequent DUI offense. The purpose of this procedure, in the absence of 
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legislative direction, was to "properly expedite the adjudication of such cases, while at 
the same time safeguard[ing] the substantial rights of accused persons and to prevent an 
accused person from being advertised to the jury as one who previously perpetrated a 
similar type of offense." Stewart. 171 P.2d at 386. This procedure was instigated by 
the Court "in view of the prejudicial nature of the evidence of prior conviction as such 
evidence bears on proof of commission of the substantive offense." Id Stanley 
maintains that this bifurcated procedure should similarly be adopted to drug charges 
that the State is seeking to enhance based on prior convictions. 
Finally, Stanley asserts, that like the obvious error in Portillo. the trial court's 
obvious error prejudiced him and deprived him of a "reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result" and should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict. Dunn. 
850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
At trial, Stanley raised the affirmative defense of entrapment to the charges 
against him. The defense of entrapment relies on an objective standard which focuses 
not on the defendant's conduct or his predisposition to commit a crime, but on the 
conduct of law enforcement personnel and their agents. However, Stanley's credibility 
was still critical to his defense. Jury Instruction #5 removed the attention of the juror's 
fifOm the issue of entrapment and the conduct of Mangum and Randall and focused it 
squarely on Stanley's history. Accordingly, Stanley was deprived of a more favorable 
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result in relation to his entrapment defense. As such, this Court should conclude that 
the trial court's erroneous jury instruction was also prejudicial and requires reversal. 
POINT III 
STANLEY WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Typically, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised concurrently with 
aff allegation of plain error because if the error was plain to the court, it should also 
have been plain to trial counsel. See, Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1208-09, 1225-29 (Utah 
1993); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 
1024 (1990); and State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 826 (Utah App. 1994). 
As a result, this Court should conclude as a matter of law that, based upon the 
obvious errors in Jury Instruction #5 to which no objection was made, Stanley was 
denied the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, this 
court can only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if 
it can do so as a matter of law."). 
In determining whether Stanley was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
"this court cannot apply rigid mechanical rules, but instead must focus on the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.f" Strickland 
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v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State v. Snyder. 860 
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). 
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show: 
(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
and (2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for 
counsel's error." State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v. 
Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Geary. 707 P.2d 645, 646 
(Utah 1985). As the Strickland two-prong test is being utilized, it should be 
remembered that the right to effective counsel is a crucial element of a criminal 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the focus of the review should be "on the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged." Strickland. 
466 U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. at 2056; Snyder. 860 P.2d at 354. 
A. Trial Counsel Rendered a Demonstrably Deficient Performance 
To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Defendant must show that 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness, but the 
court is not to second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices. Strickland. 466 
UTS. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennvson. 850 p.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 
1993); Crestani. 707 P.2d at 1089. It should have been obvious to counsel-as well as 
the court-that the question of penalty or punishment is not within the province of the 
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jury. Therefore, counsel should have objected to the court's penalty instructions and 
requested that they be stricken from the record. 
Likewise, counsel had an obligation to submit and to carefully consider the 
proposed jury instructions. If counsel had taken the time to carefully read and study 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and (2)(d) and State v. Portillo. 914 P.2d 724 
(Utah App. 1996), then it would have become obvious to her that subsection 8(2)(d) 
that whether a charged count is a second or subsequent conviction is not an essential 
criminal element, but a mere sentencing enhancement. At the very least, counsel 
should have at least strongly voiced her exceptions to such instructions particularly in 
light of the entrapment defense she was presenting to the jury. 
Similarly, if this Court concludes that trial counsel invited the trial court's 
erroneous Instruction #5 because she stipulated that Stanley had a prior conviction and 
that such language be included in Jury Instruction #3, then counsel's performance was 
likewise deficient. The jury should not have been instructed as to Stanley's prior 
conviction particularly before reaching a verdict on the underlying offense. 
Fundamental fairness requires that counsel should of at least argued for a bifurcated 
proceeding where the jury is only given evidence of the prior conviction after rendering 
a guilty verdict on the underlying offense. 
36 
B. Absent Counsel1 s Deficient Performance a Reasonable Likelihood of a More 
Favorable Result for Portillo Existed 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability has been described as 
"a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See Strickland. 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Tennyson. 850 P.2d at 466; Crestam, 771 P.2d at 
1089. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Crestani. 771 P.2d at 
1092. In this particular case the adversarial process cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result. Had counsel done her homework with respect to the status of 
the law in regards to the impropriety of the jury being instructed with regards to 
punishment, and had counsel carefully studied the proposed jury instructions in 
connection with the applicable statute, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different 
result would have been reached at trial. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate Stanley's convictions on grounds that 
"counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
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POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT AS TO THE 
"DRUG-FREE ZONE" ELEMENT 
Stanley was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, distribution of 
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone and use/possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone (R. 156, 157). Whether the underlying drug offense is subject to a 
"drug-free zone" enhancement is an element of the offense which must be proved by 
the State beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App. 
1996). Stanley asserts that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain the 
jury's verdict as to the "drug-free zone" element. 
Jury Instruction #9 defines a "drug-free zone" as "any area within 1,000 feet of 
any structure, facility or grounds of: 1) a public or private elementary or secondary 
school; 2) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution; 3) in 
those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, 
at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution; 4) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 5) in a public 
park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 6) in a church or synagogue; 7) in 
a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 8) in a public parking lot or structure" (R. 
145). See also, Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a). 
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The underlying drug offenses for which Stanley was convicted occurred in a 
room at the Timpanogos Inn in Lehi at approximately 11p.m. (R. 211 at 147-49, 159-
65, 275). Officer Harold Terry testified that the Timpanogos Inn is located in a drug-
free zone because there is a playground at the McDonald's located across the street 
about a block from the Inn as well as part of the high school grounds (R. 211 at 294). 
Terry estimated the distance to be approximately 630 feet (Id.). Terry said he knew the 
distance was within the 1,000 foot radius because he had al one time-involving another 
case-looked at the distance on a topographical map (Id.). However, Tern did noi 
measure the distance-either from the edge of the motel property, or more specifically, 
from the actual motel room—nor had he prepared a map for this case (R. 212 at 7). No 
other testimony or evidence was pi mini ai J( dial concerning whether or not the 
underlying offenses at the motel room took place within 1,000 feet of the high school 
grounds or McDonald's playground. 
Even assuming that the McDonald's playground qualifies as a "drug-free zone", 
Stanley asserts that the evidencr piodm al it I (rial was insufficient to establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the underlying offenses took place within 1,000 feet ol such a 
drug-free zone. Powasnik. 918 P.2d at 148 ("Drug-free zone" enhancement is element 
of underlying offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. 
Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (Jurv verdict must be reversed for insufficient 
evidence if evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entntained a 
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reasonable doubt). Terry's testimony, which consisted entirely of his estimate as to 
distance and his one-time check of a topographical map, may have established that a 
portion of the Timpanogos Inn was located within 1,000 feet of the high school grounds 
or McDonald's playground. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that the actual 
motel room where the underlying offenses occurred is within 1,000 of such drug-free 
zones. Accordingly, Stanley requests that this Court reverse his convictions because 
the evidence produced at trial was too inconclusive to establish, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the underlying drug offenses actually occurred in a drug-free zone. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Stanley respectfully asks that this Court reverse his convictions because the trial 
court's instructions to the jury relating to the defense of entrapment were legally 
insufficient and prejudicial. Alternatively, Stanley asks that this Court find that the trial 
court committed plain error in instructing the jury that Stanley's prior conviction was a 
substantive element of Count III; and that Stanley's trial counsel was likewise 
ineffective. Finally, Stanley requests that this Court find that the evidence produced at 
trial was insufficient and inconclusive to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Count I and Count III took place in a drug-free zone.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X day of September, 1999. 
) 
Margaret^. Cindsay Jf 
Counsel for Stanley u 
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58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 200 
section (8). Each separate violation o: this subsection is a 
thir.: degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty 
n • :•.? exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 5S-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall 
h, deposited in the General Fund. 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit 
information to the database as required under this section 
after the division has submitted a specific written request 
for the information or when the division determines the 
individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit 
the information as required is grounds for the division to 
take the following actions in accordance with Section 
5S-1-401: 
(i) refuse to iss...- a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(hi) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the 
individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civi' violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(IS) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
uvihy liable for having submitted the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shal! be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of anv resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet. ' 1996 
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: -
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; ..>> • 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; u
 v - ^ 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or ''•••* * 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
where: -•. .-.•• • • ' • • • • • , - . > ; / A • -v. 
(A) the person participates, directs; or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felon}'; and 
(B) the violation is a par t of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions tha t are undertaken in concert with 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervi. 
sor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (ijfoj 
with inspect to: . ;,* 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II
 o r ; 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a secon* 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent COQ. 
viction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV ^ 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and UTW 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a secoo* 
degree felony; or '^4 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guiltyf! 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsd 
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felonyyi 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable hi 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less thai! 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition £ 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and tin! 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally• jj 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it w«l 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, dire™ 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of & | 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized yfj 
this subsection; *I 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boci 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally*! 
permit them to be occupied by .persons unlawfbl? 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled 
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
possess an altered or forged prescription or writ 
order for a controlled substance. , 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Sub 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to: * , v » 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds orn 
is guilt}- of a second degree felony; i« ( ' 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, 
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, bu^ 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance ani 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant," 
the amount is more than one ounce but less thai 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted 'of violating Sul 
(2Xa)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of pi 
• occupied by any correctional facility as defined in 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confini 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greaf 
provided in Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty 
provided in this subsection. ' - ' , l , : \ l 
- ( e ) Any person who violates'Subsection (2)(aX£ 
respect to all other controlled substances not incl 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less thaifj 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemc? 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent cm1 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Sul 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: • 
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i ) o & a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
^demeanor; and 
§53 on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
^&E& degree felony. 
P^gafced acts C — Penalties: 
(a)B: is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
# to use in the course of the manufacture or 
. ^arfwition of a controlled substance a license num-
^ fcor which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
. to Mother person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
oaitoBed substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
jffiMfiiTiH < Ifln be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
person; 
to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
ton for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
n of, or to procure the administration of any 
substance by misrepresentation or failure 
fcfKbe person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
jafisftnce from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
ttajSafeterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
tni f*"' for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
afermme or address; 
0 f e * make any false or forged prescription or 
order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
or to alter any prescription or written order 
aHBoicr written under the terms of this chapter; or 
„ $$ to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
$jafc*,sfcone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
acsgsoduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
masking mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
, JSBBKSE of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
afcnoKr or labeling so as to render any drug a 
. aaarffedeit controlled substance. 
K&arperson convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
Bgnl|p£a third degree felony. 
MSStad acts D —- Penalties: 
iding other provisions pf this section, a 
authorized under this chapter who commits 
to be unlawful under this section, Title 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
conviction subject to the penalties and 
under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is com-
i a public or private elementary or secondary 
•r on the grounds of any of those schools; 
a a public or private vocational school or 
l^fatitammdary institution or on the grounds of any of 
ols or institutions; 
those portions of any building, park, sta-
ler other structure or grounds which are, at the 
fthe act,* being used for an activity sponsored 
gh a school or institution under Subsec-
Ki) and (ii); 
^ K i n o r on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
La public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
i center; x * : u J. 
W£a?a church or synagogue; 
*€fi&*m a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
ater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
i adjacent thereto; > 
*4Kk iaa public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of 
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would other-
wise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the indi-
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred 
was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty 
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi-
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
' of the substance or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision.' ' - ** ' > 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
1
 (a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
" an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
(
 investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
v
 the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b)' any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
7




**(ll) If any provision of this chapter? or'the application of 
41
 any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
* invalid provision or application. ' ^ " ? **w «-
 1997 
» ' •» , . w, * =? r i i ( » « * ' i - . v * <,%} 
58-37-8.5. Applicabil i ty of Title 76 prosecut ions under 
th i s chapter. * f <• : 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
chapter. ^ - - 1997 




















(jfieMtai agent of a corporation or association v* ho 
a^^riaes of such responsibility that his conduct 
-ggaaifely may be assumed to represent the policy of 
ffiM«rooration or association 
^iEttgoration" means all organizations required by 
j. Tfoffg i f this state or any other state to obtain a 
j^rfggsdte of authority, a certificate of incorporation or 
^for foam* of registration to transact busuiess as a 
^gast&m withm this state or any other state and shall 
-mjfr^kAamestic, foreign, profit and nonprofit corpora-
«gMmyto&shall not mclude a corporation sole, as such 
mi in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 
•& of an appropriate certificate of authority, 
or other form of registration shall be no 
t such organization conducted its business in 
feto appear to have lav* ful corporate existence 
1973 
t 'tfKSSSf flfcsniinal responsibil ity for direct commis-
h
 snaa of offense or for conduct of another. 
^targfciwa, acting with the mental state required fo~ the 
imrg0ssSL *& am offense who directly commits the offense, 
^pgaSasHfaests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
i to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
jfosr&W'*'criminally hable as a party for such conduct 
. jBta&nses unavailable in prosecut ion based 
imeonduct of another. 
flugagg&Bscution m which an actor's criminal responsibil-
wibrfiffl: the conduct of another, it is no defense 
ISHfe&the actor belongs to a class of persons v. ho by 
* (jmu&moithe offense is legally incapable of committing 
ttitoeAamin an individual capacity, or 
&OT&1E the person for whose conduct the actor is 
r responsible has been acquitted, has not been 
lor convicted, has been convicted of a different 
* of a different type or class of offense or is 
l prosecution 1973 
IIWSMKL l u m i n a l responsibil ity of corporat ion or as-
jftBtiation. 
Mmspsstwa or association is guilty of an offense when 
$Hi3£ei conduct constituting the offense consists of an 
j jnsiim&i discharge a specific duty of affirmative perfor-
mmmmgased on corporations or associations by law, or 
u
 KHfeconduct constituting the offense is authorized, 
taSayg. requested, commanded, or undertaken, per-
SmmMJtir lecklessly tolerated by the board of directors or 
3ipa2|a^nianagerial agent acting within the scope of his 
m$jj$mai and m behalf of the corporation or associa-
^ i w 1973 
responsibil i ty of person for con-
i n name of corporat ion or assoc iat ion . 
criminally hable for conduct constituting an 
lie performs or causes to be performed in the 
of a corporation or association to the same 
conduct were performed in his own name or 
1973 
PART 3 
I TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
under fourteen years old not crimi-
. ¥ xmdfy responsible. 
KlpWimai*crimmally responsible for conduct performed 
^^ WfeftajwcbBs the age of fourteen years This section shall 
**toto&$Hauk the jurisdiction of or proceedings before the 
K#%ft*acar«f this state 1973 
76-2-302. Compulsion. 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in 
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the 
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force 
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a 
person of reasonable firmness m his situation would not have 
resisted 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall 
be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable 
that he will be subjected to duress 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the 
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or 
to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1) 
provided 1973 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into com-
mitting the offense Entrapment occurs when a law enforce-
ment officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation 
with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order 
to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution bv 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when 
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the 
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct 
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment 
(3) The defense provided b> this section is available even 
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to 
constitute the offense 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall 
hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of 
fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit 
the offense Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten 
days before trial except the court for good cause shown may 
permit a later filing 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was 
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the 
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue 
may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial Any 
order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment 
shall be appealable by the state 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense 
of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall 
not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant 
testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felomes 
and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on 
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial 
1973 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any 
prosecution for that crime 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or mean-
ing of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reason-
ably beheved his conduct did not constitute an offense, 
and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon 
d) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an adminis-
trative agency charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law m question, or 
I ' ; 
£ - = • • 
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MEMORANDUM OE POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
BASED ON ENTRAPMENT 
Case No. 971400540 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS 
Defendant, Patrick Stanley, by and through counsel, Camille L. Neider hereby submits the 
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based 
on Entrapment. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On March 27,1997, Mr. Stanley was contacted by Edee Randall, a confidential informant for 
Emery County Sheriffs Office, about repayment of a personal loan. Mr. Stanley and Ms. Randall met 
in Spanish Fork in order for Ms. Randall to repay the debt Ms. Randall was accompanied by 
undercover officer from the Emery Count}' Sheriffs Office. During the conversations that took place 
b . . een Mr. Stanley and Ms. Randall, sor ~ of which were not ;;ea: d or recorded by the undercover 
officer, Ms. Randall exploited her personal relationship with Mr. Stanley and entrapped him into helping 
her acquire methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah law recognizes a defendant's right to assert an affirmative defense of entrapment. U.C.A. 
§ 76-2-303; State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). The State continues to bear the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt after a defendant asserts an affirmative defense such as entrapment. State v. 
Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977). If there is a 
reasonable doubt as to whether or not defendant was entrapped, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, 
either as a matter of law as determined by the judge or as a matter of fact as determined by the fact 
finder. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980). 
Utah Code defines entrapment as follows: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute 
entrapment. 
U.C.A. § 76-2-303 (1). 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted an "objective" standard for determining whether or not 
entrapment has occurred. Taylor, 599 P.2d at 502. The objective standard focuses on the conduct of the 
police and their agents rather than the disposition of the criminal defendant. State v. Beddoes. 890 P.2d 
1, 3 (Utah App. 1995). Entrapment turns on the facts of each case and several factors must be 
considered by the trial court in order to determine whether or not entrapment occurred. Id. At a 
minimum, "in evaluating the course of conduct between the government representative and the 
defendant, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the 
defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the 
effect of the governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal person." Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. The 
Utah Supreme Court cautioned trial courts tnat this is not an '"average person" test but one that considers 
the circumstances of each defendant in rel '^-'on to the police conduct. State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 750 
(19S4). 
Examples of behavior that rise to the level of entrapment are "[ejxtreme pleas of d operate 
ilh.. :s. of appeals base i prh:vn":!y on sympathy, pity • -,;• close personal friendship, or offers <.7 inordinate 
sums of money..." Taylor. 599 P.2d at 503. Utah Courts have found the "mere existence of a personal 
relaiionship does not establish entrapment," but that exploitation of the "relationship in an eppeal to 
defendant's sympathy of pity" does establish entrapment. Beddoes. 890 P.2d at 3 (internal cites 
omitted); State v. Martinez. 848 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah App. 1993).. 
In this case, Mr. Stanley's relationship with Ms. Randall was exploited and resulted in 
entrapment by the State's representative. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Stanley respectfully requests the charges in the above captioned 
case be dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this of July 1997. 
Camflle L. Neider 
"Attorney for Mr. Stanley 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Entrapment to be hand delivered to the Office of 
the Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ^ day of A > , _ / t ^ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. M 
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence 
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 




INSTRUCTION N'O. "; / 
^ i ' ^ ^ ' l 
lL\pO(c^p 
It is a"defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the ouense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement cf^cer or a person direct ^ by or acting in 
:ooperatior; with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
:ommiss:or: for prosecution - method, '....eating a so..:.onitiai risk tiiat die of:dnse would be 
connm'tee ov one r..r ocivcrwnse. reaov v 
The test to determine an unlawful entrapment is whether a law enforcement official or an 
agenc, in order to ob;ain evidence of the commission of an offense, induced the defendant to commit 
such an offense v^idijvmldJ^e^ffero 
me r ely^pT eTTtl ^ Tc^o7tu~m • cro ffe i ;se~ 
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
personal friendship, o; offers of inordinc .. sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation 
of the circumstances in each case of what might constiaite prohibited police conduct. In evaluating 
the course of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions 
leading up to the offense, the interaction eetween the agent and the defendant, and the response to the 
inducements of the agent are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the governmental 
agent's conduct would be on a normal -person.— 
DmA tot fa ty J4^unfc prjtilfSfosnm>^
 % ^Jjdo^S p. 3 
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INSTRUCTION NO 0 
The essential elements of the cnme^charged in <25^ S£28?of the Amended Information are as 
follows: 
£> That the defendant, Patrick Stanley, 
On or about March 27, 1997, 
*§) In Utah County, Utah, 
@> Did knowingly and intentionally, 
t|) Use. ^ P^SLGS 
(6) Methamphetamine, 
$) A Schedule II controlled substance, 
$) In a drug free zone, 
(§> And had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance onB6&tefs*f 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more 
of iirabove essential elements of the crime, you should find the defendant not guilty. On the other 
haailif the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as 
setliilfi above, then you should find the defendant guilty of the crime. 
